Hi Wes - Glad to see the 7th is still alive and kicking!    My records indicate that we had a number of casualties at Overloon.  I was not there at that time since my company B was attached to the 113th Cavalry but  few years ago I interviewed one of the men for a video I was producing.

In one instance a Company C mile laying party came under fire.   When the Germans discovered what was going on they laid in fire:  T/5 George saunders was killed by an exploding mine

          Lt. Mansel Mayeux, mortor shell 

          Cpl Harlan Redunz  - machine gun

          Donald Berger - Machine gun

Without  supporting detail, my records show:        Pvt. Quenten Bright received a purple heart for wounds in the same are

                                                                               Pfc. Charles Piltzecker received a purple heart for wounds in the same area.

                                                                               He died in a  hospital in July 1945. We assume from the wounds received

 

Hope this will be helpful

 

Ed. Husted

82nd historian

 

 

 Thanks, Ed,
 I am going to see what I can find on these men. But do you have dates for their deaths?
 Are all of these C/82 men? A/82 was also attached to 7AD.
 Was Bright killed or just wounded?
 You did not by any chance have a George SHINTS (middle initial possibly F or P) in the 82nd? Remains of a guy with that name were recovered north of where the battle was, and I have not yet figured out who he was.
 I am going to send you a separate e-mail with all the mentions of the 82nd in the After Action Reports of the 7AD units at that time.
 
    Wes
______________________________________________
  
July 19/10  

Thanks again, Ed,

 

I checked the ABMC website of overseas burials, and both SANDERS (they spell it that way and not SAUNDERS) and PILTZECKER (who they show as a T/5) are buried in Europe -- Sanders at Henri-Chapelle and Piltzecker at Margraten. Piltzecker's grand-nephew also posted a WWII Registry entry for him, which includes his picture -- and also his middle name: Hugo.

 

I am going to give all these names to the local historians in Holland. They will only include KIAs and DOWs and guys captured at Overloon who died as POWs on the monument. So they will not include the guys who were wounded and survived, but this information helps to understand the battle and to at least have these guys recognize those who were casualties there.

 

If you have dates for any of the guys who were wounded, that would be a big help. Were Berger, Radunz and Mayeux all wounded in the same operation when Sanders was killed?

 I also discovered several more mentions of the 82nd in the 7AD reports, and I will send that to you separately.

 

    Wes

____________________________________________________
 

In a message dated 7/19/2010 5:26:54 P.M. Pacific Daylight Time, alpha1@netsync.net writes:

Just received the after action...thanks

Wes - your information sent me back to  our history records.  Found some new info:  First, wrong Company:  It was company A, not C who took casualities. There is a conflict in the records but further research shows it was A Company.  Also found more casualty info:

 

Here's the up date: All A company

 

Killed in Action - T/5 George D. Saunders -- mine laying party KIA list shows 10/6/44 but I it was probably about Oct. 1st

wounded - Sgt. Donald L. Berger - mine laying party 

wounded - Cpl. Harlan Radunz - mine laying party 

wounded - Lt. Mansel Mayeux - mine laying party

ADDED -- Sgt. Ralph M. Lober Jr. - Reported wounded in Overloon Operation - no detail

wounded - Pvt. Quenten Bright - Reported wounded in Overloon operation - no detail

wounded - Pfc. Charles Piltzecker - Rec. Purple Heart but for wounds this period  no detail (died in hospital - June1, '45)

 Our records are the same as yours....Operation was  scrubbed Oct. 6 and returned on the 7th  A/C Companies moved to Albeek Holland - Co B left the 113th on the 8th and rejoined the Battalion. 

 NO GEORGE SHINTS LISTED HERE

 

 Ed. Husted
- __________________________________________________________-
  

July 19/10      Hi Ed,

 

First, I need to correct my comment on the 30 Sep report in my prior note:

 

[WJ Comment: 7AD Combat Command "B" Task Force 1 was the main initial assault task force on the eastern end of the battle, attacking from Boxmeer south to Sambeek and then to Vortum and Mellum. It is most likely that this platoon was from A/82, since C/82 was attached to CCA in the westernmost attack and also because later mentions place A/82 in this eastern area. TF 1 was more infantry-heavy, and TF 2 was more tank-heavy, though both had one or more companies of each.]

 

I confused CCB Force 1 and Force 2, as far as which was further east. CCB Force 1 (aka TF Johansen) was the main attacking force directly south from St. Anthonis to Overloon. It was the tank-heavy Force 2 (with only B/23 AIB attached as infantry) that was the easternmost force that attacked Sambeek and then Vortum and Mellum. But as you will see in the information below, A/82 had a platoon with each of these forces. So it is not possible for me to tell which force the casualties were with, and thus I can only say that they were either (1) in or near the first woods south of St Anthonis along the road to Overloon [TF 1] or (2) between Sambeek and Vortum [TF 2].

 

OK, here are the new references that I found.

 

30 Sep 1944

31 Tank Bn (CCB Force 1 attacking Sambeek and Vortum)

Force now consists of Hq, A & B 31st; B/23; B/814; C/434; 1 Plat B/33; and 1 Plat A/82 Combat Engineers.
The force moved from DEUNE, HOLLAND at 0725 and closed into the assembly area near ST. ANIHOINES at 1000. The force was reserviced and ready to attack at 1130 - Awaiting orders.
At 1600 - the advance guard which consisted of 1 platoon B/31 and a platoon of B/23 moved out to attack the town of BOXMER. The balance of B/23 moved into BOXMER, dismounted, and pushed on South into outskirts of SAMBEEK. The tanks bipassed BOXMEER and moved South until they were West of VORTUM. All units received fairly heavy mortar and artillery fire.
Just at darkness, it was decided to pull the tanks back about 1 mile and have the Infantry outpost them - planning to renew the attack at dawn tomorrow.

 

[WJ Comment: So a platoon of A/82 was with Force 1, and the platoon with Force 2 (in the 23 AIB report in my first note) was almost certainly from A/82.]

 

2 Oct 1944

17th Tank Bn (CCR TF Wemple attacking 3-4 Oct 44 south from west of Hof toward Hattert)

2 OCTOBER FOUND CC-R IN ASSEMBLY AREA. AT 021200 C/87 ATTACHED TO CC-R. THEY WERE IMMEDIATELY GIVEN THE MISSION OF RECONNOITERING AND DETERMINING POSSIBLE ROUTES OF ADVANCE TO THE FRONT LINE OF DIVISION WHERE RELIEF COULD BE EFFECTED IF SO DESIRED BY HIGHER HQS.
 38TH ARMORED INF BN (-1 CO) DETACHED CC-B AND ATTACHED CC-R 021630 OCTOBER 44. MOVED INTO ASSEMBLY AREA VIC ST. ANTHONIS, HOLLAND. DETACHMENTS MAINTAINED ROAD BLOCKS.
 AT 022330 OCTOBER DIVISION ISSUED ORDERS FOR CC-R TO MOVE OVER PREVIOUSLY RECONNOITERED ROUTES FROM OUR PRESENT LOCATION TO ATTACK AROUND CC-B EAST OF PRESENT FRONT LINE OF CC-B AT 030800 OCTOBER 44. TO RELIEVE CC-B AND GIVEN THE MISSION OF CLEARING HOSTILE RESISTANCE WITHIN COMBAT COMMAND ZONE.
 A/82 ENGINEERS TO SUPPORT CC-R IN OUR POSITIONS.
 440 ARMORED FIELD ARTILLERY ATTACHED TO CC-R.

 

[WJ Comment: CCR took over the eastern attack from CCB, but 38 AIB and A/82 which had been in the CCB attack were switched over to CCR and had no relief. The CCR attack began 3 Oct.]

3 Oct 1944

17th Tank Bn (CCR TF Wemple attacking 3-4 Oct 44 south from west of Hof toward Hattert)

3 OCTOBER 44 CC-R CONSISTING OF 17 TANK BN(-), 38 ARMD, INF. BN., 440 F.A., C/87 RCN, A/82 ENGRS IN SUPPORT, RELIEVED CC-B IN ZONE BEGINNING AT 030800 OCTOBER 44. 434TH F.A. REINFORCING FIRES OF 440 F.A. BN.
 CC-R SPLIT INTO 2 TASK FORCES, TASK FORCE FULLER AND WEMPLE.
 TASK FORCE WEMPLE CONSISTED OF 17TH TANK BN (-C0. C), C/38TH ARMD, INF. BN., 1/C/87.
 TASK FORCE FULLER CONSISTED OF 38TH ARMD. INF. BN. (-CO.C), C/17TH TANK BN.
 TASK FORCE WEMPLE MET STUBBORN RESISTANCE. INFANTRY WAS PINNED DOWN BY INTENSE FIRE OF ALL CALIBERS. TANKS ADVANCED 500 YARDS IN EASTERN SECTOR OF ZONE, WERE FORCED T0 WITHDRAW BY BAZOOKAS AND ARTY FIRE. ONE (1) TANK WAS LOST TO A MINE, 3 WERE-KNOCKED OUT BY ANTI-TANK GUNS AND 1 BY A BAZOOKA. TASK FORCE FULLER PROGRESSED SLOWLY AGAINST THE ENEMY, ENCOUNTERING HEAVY SMALL ARMS, MORTAR AND ARTY FIRE. NEBELWERFFR FIRE (SCREAMING MINNIES) WERE RECEIVED FOR THE FIRST TIME. ELEMENTS OF CC-B INFILTRATED TO POSITIONS  APPROXIMATELY 600 YARDS IN FRONT OF LINE OF DEPARTURE.
 ENGINEERS MAINTAINED ROADS, REPAIRED DAMAGED BRIDGES AND REMOVED MINES IN TASK FORCE WEMPLES ZONE.
 PREPARATION FOR A NIGHT ATTACK WAS MADE. INFANTRY WAS WELL DUG IN, PREPARED TO REPULSE ANY COUNTER-ATTACKS THAT SHOULD COME.
_____________________________________________________________

July 19/10    

Hi Ed,

 

I have not included the 7AD Artillery After Action Reports, since those are unlikely to mention the engineers. Here are all the mentions of 82nd Engr than I did find. I will separately send a grid map of the area, so that any coordinates mentioned can be plotted.

 

     Wes Johnston

     Historian, 7AD Association

 

30 Sep 1944

23rd Armored Infantry Battalion - Battle Report (attached to Combat Command "B")

The series of operations in which the 23d Armored Infantry Battalion engaged during the month of October began on 30 September 1944 when the battalion moved to a new assembly north of Overloon as part of the 7th Armored Division plan to clear hostile resistance in the division zone west along the Meuse River and contact the 1st Belgian Brigade, advancing from the south. See Field Order #11, Hq CC "B", 291900 Sep 44, attached; March Order, Hq., 23d Armored Infantry Battalion 292300 Sep 44, attached; Field Order #7, Hq., 23d Armored Infantry Battalion 300400 Sep 44, attached.
The battalion attacked on the morning of 30 September 1944, with the 23d, less Company "B" (attached Force 2), as the infantry element of CC "B" Force 1 (Company "C", 31st Tank Battalion; Company "B", 33rd Armored Engineer Battalion - less 1st Platoon; 434th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, less Battery "C"; 3d Platoon, Company "B", 814th Tank Destroyer Battalion; and 1 Platoon, 82nd Engineer Battalion.) MAJOR THEODORE JOHANSEN, Commanding Officer of the 23d, was force commander. (See Field Order #7, op. cit.)
Initial resistance was encountered north of woods south of Sam Beeksche Heidt. Companies "A" and "C" dismounted and advanced on foot, encountering enemy artillery, antitank, mortar, bazooka, and small arms fire. Enemy infantry strength was estimated at three companies.
Despite the supporting fires of artillery and tanks, progress was very slow. The terrain was heavily wooded, for the most part, but contained some flat, barren stretches. The enemy made maximum use of grazing fire in these areas and of fire lanes cut through the woods. The troops pushed forward as far as the far edge of the woods during the first day's fighting, but no more progress was made during the ensuing two days.

 

[WJ Comment: 7AD Combat Command "B" Task Force 1 was the main initial assault task force on the eastern end of the battle, attacking from Boxmeer south to Sambeek and then to Vortum and Mellum. It is most likely that this platoon was from A/82, since C/82 was attached to CCA in the westernmost attack and also because later mentions place A/82 in this eastern area. TF 1 was more infantry-heavy, and TF 2 was more tank-heavy, though both had one or more companies of each.]

 

33rd Armored Engineer Battalion - After Action Report (33 AEB was organic to 7AD.)

The Engineer Battalion less Company "A", Company "B", and Company "C", attached to their respective combat commands, and with the 82nd Combat Engineer Battalion in direct support of the 7th Armored Division bivouacked in an area one mile southwest of St Anthonis, Holland on 30 September 1944.

 

1 Oct 1944

7AD Combat Command "A" - After Action Report

1 October 1944 - On 1 October 1944 CC "A" CP was located 3/4 of a mile South of OPLOO, NETHERLANDS. On this date elements of CCA, divided into two Task Forces attacked to the South for the town of OVERLOON. The Task Forces were as follows: Task Force Brown, commanded by Major BROWN, CO 40th Armd Tank Bn, and Task Force Chappuis, commanded by Lt Colonel CHAPPUIS, CO 48th Armored Infantry Bn. The former was composed of the 40th Armd Tk Bn (-A,D), B Company of the 48th Armd Inf En, 1st Platoon, A Company, 814th Tank Destroyer Bn, C Company, 82nd Engr Bn, and the 489th Armored Field Artillery Bn. Elements of Task Force Chappuis were the 48th Armd Inf Bn (-B), D Company and A Company of the 40th Armd Tank Bn, A Company, 814th Tank Destroyer Bn (-1st Pl), A Company, 33rd Armd Engr Bn, and the 440th Armd Field Artillery Bn. The attack began at about 0630 and continued throughout the day under stubborn resistance. Tanks were held up by AT fire but our infantry succeeded in entering the outskirts of the town despite heavy artillery and AP fire from enemy positions. At 1925 1 October 1944 our troops were digging in on the outskirts of town to maintain gains made during the day. Task Force Commanders were informed on the night of 1 October 44 that a two minute fire mission would be fired by 7 battalions of artillery at 0628 to 0630 on the morning of 2 October 44, following which the attack was to be resumed.

 

[WJ Comment: 7AD CCA Task Force Brown was on the left (east and then north flank of the attack of the two task forces from Oploo south along the road toward Overloon. Many remains from the other task force (TF Chappuis) were later recovered from the area of Kamphof, just west of Overloon and south of the road. This area south of the road suffered day after day of German counterattacks, but TF Brown north of the road did not have as many casualties. TF Brown was a more tank-heavy TF, and TF Chappuis was more infantry-heavy, though both had one or more companies of each.]

 

33 AEB

1. 1 October 1944, this battalion, less Company ""A"" attached to Combat Command ""A"", Company ""B"" attached to Combat Command ""B"" and Company ""C"" attached to Task Force Jones was bivouacked in an area one mile southwest of St. Anthonis, Holland. The 82nd Engineer Combat Battalion was in support of the 7th Armored Division, and worked under the supervision of the Division Engineer. Engineer companies, at this time, were employed primarily as infantry, and performed little engineer work although mines were removed and roads patrolled. Company ""A"" and Company ""B"" were supporting Combat Command ""A"" and Combat Command ""B"" in the vicinity of St. Anthonis, Holland.
2. Our Division front was along the general line 720350 to 720810, map-reference. GSGS 2541 Sheet 5, no engineer work was being done, and the companies were standing by. A perimeter defense was placed in effect protecting the area enclosing the Division using elements of Combat Commands not engaged in action and Task Force Jones. Company ""C"" was guarding road-blocks established by Task Force Jones. Three road-blocks were maintained, one in the town of Liesel, Holland, another in the vicinity of Zielberg, Holland, the third was on the Wasberg and Grooteberg, Holland road north of Deurne, Holland. The first two road-blocks consisted of anti-tank mines, ready to place with anti-tank guns from the 814th Tank Destroyer Battalion; the latter being a bridge prepared for demolition and covered by tank destroyers. Company ""B"" reported an enemy road-block at 738355, map-reference GSGS 2541, Sheet 5, which upon investigation turned out to be cord wood that had been accidently knocked across the road during darkness.

 

 

2 Oct 1944

17th Tank Battalion - After Action Report (attached to Combat Command "R", which relieved CCB)

The battalion remained in the same assembly area. The Bn Staff and the Bn Commander made visits to higher headquarters and to the headquarters of the units in contact in order to keep up with the situation. Late in the afternoon the Bn Commander went to a meeting at C.C. "R" Hq and received the plan and his orders for the attack which was to begin on 3 Oct 44. C.C. "R" had been ordered to relieve C.C. "B" who was in contact with the enemy in the vicinity of the towns of Mullen and Vortum. C.C. "A" was attacking the town of Overloon from the west and they had been stopped by heavy enemy resistance before they were in the town. C.C. "R"'s plan briefly was to the south and east remaining on the west side of the Railroad and to seize positions directly east of the town of Overloon. The C.C. "R" commanding Officer divided his command into two forces, one commanded by Lt. Col. FULLER to be known as Task Force FULLER and one commanded by Lt. Col. WEMPLE to be known as Task Force WEMPLE. Task Force WEMPLE consisted of the 17th Tank Battalion minus Company "D" and Company "C"; Company "C" of the 38th Inf. Bn., and one platoon from Company "A" of the 82nd Engineer Bn. Company "D" of the 17th Tank Bn was still with Task Force JONES and Company "C" of the 17th was to be with Task Force FULLER. Task Force WEMPLE was to move from the assembly area through St. Antonis and southeast along a route which had been picked by the 87th Rcn. Sqd. to the line of departure which was the road going southwest out of the small town of Hof. The left or east boundry of this force was the railroad running northwest and southeast. The Rcn. Squadron was to furnish a guide to lead the force to the line of departure and the force was to be in position on the line of departure ready to start the attack at 0800, 3 October 1944.

At 2230, 2 October 1944 Lt. Col. WEMPLE called all of the officers of his force together and gave them the plan and their orders. Since the force did not expect to encounter any strong enemy resistance until after L.D. had been crossed the force was ordered to stay on the road until that point had been reached and the following march order was given: 1 Platoon of Medium Tanks from Co "B", 1 Platoon of Infantry from Co "C" of the 38th Inf Bn followed by the remainder of the tanks in Co "B", then the platoon of Engineers followed by the Force Commanders Tank and his S-3 in a half track and the air support tank, then the remainder of Co "C" of the 38th Inf Bn followed by Co "A" of the 17th, then the assault Gun Platoon, the Mortar Platoon and the rear command group. Elements of the 87th Rcn Sqd were to act as left flank guard for Force WEMPLE and were to advance on the east side of the railroad.
All elements of Task Force WEMPLE were ordered to stay on the road until contact was made then the force was to leave the road and to deploy as much as the terrain would permit. The force had been ordered to be in position on the line of departure by 0800 and to wait there until C.C."R" ordered the force to attack.

 

[WJ Comment: CCR TF Wemple was a tank-heavy TF that attacked on 3 and 4 Oct 1944 south from a position a short distance west of Hof toward the chateau "De Hattert". They suffered heavy casualties and ultimately wound up back at the line of departure after two days of battle. It seems likely that the engineers that would have been in TF Fuller, the infantry-heavy task force, were from C/33 but may have been from A/82. Unfortunately, the 38 AIB (Fuller's battalion) A/AR makes no mention of the 82nd.]

 

33 AEB

2 October 1944, Company "B" swept the road running from St. Anthonis, Holland to Overloon, Holland for mines and obstacles, none were discovered, on this road check Company "B" reached a point 746340, aforementioned reference. Company "C", 82nd Engineer Combat Battalion (in support) established road patrols into the vicinity of Overloon, Holland.

 

[WJ Comment: Recall that C/82 was attached to TF Brown of CCA, attacking Overloon from the west along the north side of the road from Oploo.]

 

3 Oct 1944

33 AEB

Company ""A"", 82nd Engineer Combat Battalion was placed in direct support of Combat Command Reserve on the 3rd of October 1944, and the second Platoon of Company ""B"", this battalion, relieved the infantry at 0300 and outposted defense lines in the vicinity of Boxmeer, Holland, no engineer work was reported and no casualties were suffered. The first platoon of Company ""B"" cleared and exploded mines at 775375, aforementioned reference, and swept a road for mines running from 775371 to 752335, same reference, The first Spengreigel (43) mines found by this battalion were at this location and were reported to the Battalion S-2 as Italian Box Mines. No information had been received by this battalion at this time that this type of mine was being used. The mines were taken apart, neutralized and information obtained by such action was forwarded to the companies of this battalion.

 

4 Oct 1944

33 AEB

Company "B" was relieved with Combat Command "B" by troops of Combat Command Reserve on 4 October 1944 and closed in bivouac near St. Anthonis, Holland at 1700 and established their security. All roads in the Division zone were clear of mines to our front. Company "A", 82nd Engineer Combat Battalion, in direct support of Combat Command Reserve, repaired a bridge at 779352, above reference. This bridge was a class 5 wooden bridge which they reinforced with 24 feet of M2 Treadway converting it into a Class 40 bridge. This company encountered Spengreigel (43) mines at 787355 which were laid on sides of the road in conjunction with a high wire fence. They were unable to remove the mines as enemy small arms fire and machine gun fire forced them to withdraw from the locality.

 

5 Oct 1944

33 AEB

5. On 5 October 1944, Company "A" fought as infantry with Combat Command "A" at 741310, above reference. They took up a defensive position at 1730, and suffered four casualties during the three counterattacks that the enemy launched that night and early the next morning. No engineer work was reported. It is interesting to note that of the four casualties suffered three were suffocation cases caused when artillery fire collapsed slit-trenches 4½ to 5 feet deep dug in loose unconsolidated sand which was predominate in that area. It is the opinion of Capt Louis C. Christian, Jr, commanding officer of Company "A", that shallow slit-trenches would have afforded as much protection and would have lessened the danger of cave-in. Barrages of 88mm guns or higher were sufficient to cause these deep slit-trenches to cave in.
6. Company "A", 82nd Engineer Combat Battalion installed 24 feet of treadway over a damaged bridge at 779322, same reference and gaped and marked an anti-tank mine field found the previous day at 787355. The mines were Spengreigel (43) mines. Engineer Reconnaissance of Headquarters Company ran a road reconnaissance of all roads in the Division zone, and reported a mine field, blown bridge and a by-pass in the vicinity of Sambeck, Holland. These mines were later removed by the first platoon of Company "B", this battalion.

 

6 Oct 1944

33 AEB

Company "B" with Combat Command "B" relieved Company "A" with Combat Command "A" on 6 October 1944. Company "A" had been fighting as infantry and Company "B" went into the line as infantry at 2310 to relieve Company "A". The relief of troops at night in this sector was difficult and nerve racking to the men in the line as they went in to an area, which was unfamiliar in the dark. Such movement proved to be successful because the darkness obliterated observed artillery fire of which the enemy had large amounts. Company "C", 82nd Engineer Combat Battalion was relieved from support of Combat Command "A" and was placed in the battalion reserve.

 

On 7 October 1944, the relief of the 7th Armored Division units by the British began. The last part of the relief was completed on 8 October 1944, and 7AD moved south to the Asten area, with 82nd Engr soon being relieved of attachment to 7AD.
___________________________________________________________

July 20/10    

Hi Ed,

 

I just realized that I might have the October 1944 Morning Reports for the 82nd. About 15 years ago, I purchased the complete set of microfilm reels (29 of them) for 38th Armored Infantry Battalion. The reels are arranged by month, and each reel contains some other units who were in the same Corps and whose numbers were near 38. As it turns out, the Oct 44 reel has units from the 17 Cav to the 83rd Armd Field Arty Bn. So it does include 82 in the range. But that does not guarantee that it has the 82nd Engineers.

 

I will have to take the reel to the library to look at the microfilm. If it does have the 82nd, then I will scan the microfilm and put each company into a separate PDF file so that you can have the images of the MRs.

 

Not sure when I can get to the library ... but I will try to do it soon.

 

     Wes

 

 

Hi again, Ed,

 

I am actually going to attach two grid maps. One is a wide area, which is less precise as to the woods. The other is a separate map of the immediate area of the battle, using the same grid but at a higher magnification (lower inch-to-foot ratio). These will allow you to plot out the grid coordinates that appear in the After Action Reports.

---

George Sanders' nephew George Sanders

 

Hi again, George,

 

My main Dutch colleague in Overloon has made contact with Ronald van Kessel and will talk with him soon. Ronald sent him the attached Google Earth photo, which is probably the same one that he sent you -- showing where he found the dogtag.

 

It is interesting to me that he would be laying mines in that location on 6 October 1944. The attack into this woods began 4 October 1944.

 

They called it the boot-shaped woods, since it looked on a map like a boot with a toe pointed to the east. You can still see that in the photo, although almost the entire foot part of the boot now is built up but was not at all built up in 1944. Nor was there a cleared area toward the mouth of the boot -- the place at the north end where you would put your foot into the boot if you were putting on the boot.

 

The 4 Oct 1944 attach was into that north end of the boot from a woods that is further north and is not visible in the picture. There were actually a couple of lesser roads coming south into the mouth of the boot which now appear to be gone. The attack was made by Task Force Fuller, which was primarily the 38th Armored Infantry Battalion, which Fuller commanded, with a few other units attached -- including A/82 or at least a platoon of A/82.

 

The attack made good initial progress, driving the Germans down to about the ankle of the boot -- just about where the first houses are now. But before they could dig in, the Germans counter-attacked and drove them back to the northern part of the woods. And that is how things remained in a stalemate for several days, until British troops finally relieved 38 AIB.

 

It is worth noting that the front that the one lone division, 7AD, had been expected to and did hold and drive forward, was replaced by an British infantry division (3rd = 9 inf bns), supported by two British armored divisions (11th = 3 inf, 4 armd bns, 79th = special tanks: flail squadron, bridging squadron, flamethrower unit) and one tank brigade (6th Guards = 2 tank bns). So what 7AD had been expected to do with 3 infantry and 3 tank battalions took the British 12 infantry and 6 armd bns plus an entire division of special tanks. That is about 4 British troops taking the place of every American. And yet would-be-historians who do not understand this battle belittle 7AD for failing to take Overloon, Venry and Venlo. And even so it took the British a bitter slow battle (12-17 Oct) to reach Venray, after which they stopped, permitting the Germans to reorganize and make a counter-attack through Meijel 27 Oct 1944 -- where once again US 7AD was stretched across a very long front that once again took 3 to 5 times as many British troops to fill once the British took over that front. And once again the would-be historians discount what 7AD did and fail to notice the massively greater force that the British moved into exactly the same positions.

 

Back to the boot-shaped woods ... 5 and 6 Oct 1944 were a series of attacks and counter-attacks, more reminiscent of WWI than WWII, as each side tried to drive the other out of the boot-shaped woods. The Germans had the position advantage, since no reinforcement of the Americans could be done without crossing the open ground north of the woods. The 17th Tank Battalion sent 3 tanks up the road on 4 Oct to try to help 38 AIB, but all of the tanks were knocked out before they ever reached the woods. I've just been working on the Individual Deceased Personnel File of one of those tankers (Thomas Jones) whose remains were never recovered -- probably cremated inside the tank. Nevertheless, 38 AIB held their positions until relieved by the Brits 7 Oct 1944.

 

The mine laying that A/82 was doing certainly helped 38 AIB defend against German counter-attacks. And it looks like they may have been protecting against a flanking attack from the east by placing the mines where your Uncle's dog tag was recovered. So this helps to understand this battle about which so little has been known. It has taken me many years of record searching and interviews -- and three trips to Overloon (1998 & 2 in 2007) -- to gather what I have put into this note. It is like a huge jigsaw puzzle, but the pieces are scattered in many places, and your Uncle's dogtag and his role have added a bit more understanding.

 

    Wesley Johnston

    Historian, 7th Armored Division Association

 

 

---

George Sanders' nephew George Sanders

 

Hi again, George,

 

My main Dutch colleague in Overloon has made contact with Ronald van Kessel and will talk with him soon. Ronald sent him the attached Google Earth photo, which is probably the same one that he sent you -- showing where he found the dogtag.

 

It is interesting to me that he would be laying mines in that location on 6 October 1944. The attack into this woods began 4 October 1944.

 

They called it the boot-shaped woods, since it looked on a map like a boot with a toe pointed to the east. You can still see that in the photo, although almost the entire foot part of the boot now is built up but was not at all built up in 1944. Nor was there a cleared area toward the mouth of the boot -- the place at the north end where you would put your foot into the boot if you were putting on the boot.

 

The 4 Oct 1944 attach was into that north end of the boot from a woods that is further north and is not visible in the picture. There were actually a couple of lesser roads coming south into the mouth of the boot which now appear to be gone. The attack was made by Task Force Fuller, which was primarily the 38th Armored Infantry Battalion, which Fuller commanded, with a few other units attached -- including A/82 or at least a platoon of A/82.

 

The attack made good initial progress, driving the Germans down to about the ankle of the boot -- just about where the first houses are now. But before they could dig in, the Germans counter-attacked and drove them back to the northern part of the woods. And that is how things remained in a stalemate for several days, until British troops finally relieved 38 AIB.

 

It is worth noting that the front that the one lone division, 7AD, had been expected to and did hold and drive forward, was replaced by an British infantry division (3rd = 9 inf bns), supported by two British armored divisions (11th = 3 inf, 4 armd bns, 79th = special tanks: flail squadron, bridging squadron, flamethrower unit) and one tank brigade (6th Guards = 2 tank bns). So what 7AD had been expected to do with 3 infantry and 3 tank battalions took the British 12 infantry and 6 armd bns plus an entire division of special tanks. That is about 4 British troops taking the place of every American. And yet would-be-historians who do not understand this battle belittle 7AD for failing to take Overloon, Venry and Venlo. And even so it took the British a bitter slow battle (12-17 Oct) to reach Venray, after which they stopped, permitting the Germans to reorganize and make a counter-attack through Meijel 27 Oct 1944 -- where once again US 7AD was stretched across a very long front that once again took 3 to 5 times as many British troops to fill once the British took over that front. And once again the would-be historians discount what 7AD did and fail to notice the massively greater force that the British moved into exactly the same positions.

 

Back to the boot-shaped woods ... 5 and 6 Oct 1944 were a series of attacks and counter-attacks, more reminiscent of WWI than WWII, as each side tried to drive the other out of the boot-shaped woods. The Germans had the position advantage, since no reinforcement of the Americans could be done without crossing the open ground north of the woods. The 17th Tank Battalion sent 3 tanks up the road on 4 Oct to try to help 38 AIB, but all of the tanks were knocked out before they ever reached the woods. I've just been working on the Individual Deceased Personnel File of one of those tankers (Thomas Jones) whose remains were never recovered -- probably cremated inside the tank. Nevertheless, 38 AIB held their positions until relieved by the Brits 7 Oct 1944.

 

The mine laying that A/82 was doing certainly helped 38 AIB defend against German counter-attacks. And it looks like they may have been protecting against a flanking attack from the east by placing the mines where your Uncle's dog tag was recovered. So this helps to understand this battle about which so little has been known. It has taken me many years of record searching and interviews -- and three trips to Overloon (1998 & 2 in 2007) -- to gather what I have put into this note. It is like a huge jigsaw puzzle, but the pieces are scattered in many places, and your Uncle's dogtag and his role have added a bit more understanding.

 

    Wesley Johnston

    Historian, 7th Armored Division Association

 

 

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